ores.shared-auth.capability-ledger.v1 · 2026-09-05

Build broad IAM. Claim only what is proven.

Shared Auth is becoming a first-party IAM and CIAM control plane for hosted authentication, account security, organizations, enterprise federation, directory lifecycle, policy, audit, and resilient deployment. This ledger separates merged evidence, bounded primitives, work in review, roadmap targets, and blocked prerequisites.

Evidence policy

This is an evidence ledger, not a blanket parity claim. A feature becomes available only when its independent interface authorities, persistence, authorization, audit, tests, deployment, and failure-state UX agree.

IAM/CIAM delivery ledger

UI and backend authority land together.

A visible control is not supported until its independent TypeSpec and JSON Schema authorities, persistence, authorization, replay protection, audit, tests, deployment evidence, and failure-state UX agree.

available

Merged repository and test evidence exists; this does not by itself prove a production deployment.

partial

A bounded primitive exists, but the complete product workflow or operational evidence does not.

in review

Implementation is on a pull request and must not be represented as deployed.

planned

The capability is in scope but no authoritative implementation is claimed.

blocked

A prerequisite contract, security boundary, persistence model, or control-plane verification is missing.

01available

Token exchange, verification, and JWKS

Provider-token exchange, access-token verification, issuer and audience enforcement, and public key discovery.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-api-server.rs
  • shared-auth-clients
  • shared-auth-interfaces

Next fail-closed gate

Keep issuer, audience, algorithm, expiry, replay, and key-rotation fixtures current across every supported SDK.

02available

Protected introspection and explicit assurance

Resource servers can require exact audience, scopes, AAL or ACR, AMR, and revocation-aware token state.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-api-server.rs
  • shared-auth-clients

Next fail-closed gate

Certify every production resource server with negative audience, scope, credential, revocation, timeout, and stale-key canaries.

03partial

Hosted sign-in, sign-up, passwordless, and social identity

Provider exchange plus email and SMS challenge primitives exist; complete hosted journeys, linking, recovery, and callback UX are not certified.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-api-server.rs
  • shared-auth-clients

Next fail-closed gate

Publish typed sign-up, recovery, OAuth callback, identity-linking, abuse-control, consent, and accessibility contracts.

04partial

MFA, TOTP, OTP, 3FA, and step-up

Factor listing, TOTP enrollment and confirmation, email and SMS challenges, and assurance-bearing step-up primitives exist.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-clients
  • 3FA-app

Next fail-closed gate

Add tenant policy, recovery approvals, reset audit, anti-enumeration, rate limits, and complete customer and admin workflows.

05partial

Passkeys and WebAuthn

Registration and authentication ceremonies carry opaque credential JSON without taking custody of biometric templates.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-clients
  • shared-auth-api-server.rs

Next fail-closed gate

Certify RP-ID and origin policy, discoverable credentials, device naming, recovery, deletion, attestation policy, and replay-negative fixtures.

06in review

Customer account and security center

MASH, Leptos SSR, and Dioxus SSR views read live identity, factor, and capability evidence while unsupported mutations remain disabled.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-web-server.rs#11

Next fail-closed gate

Pass format, clippy, tests, authorization, cookie, dependency, image, Cloud Run, and Kubernetes admission gates before promotion.

07planned

Organizations, tenants, invitations, RBAC, and ABAC

Organization switching, invitation lifecycle, memberships, groups, roles, permissions, and tenant policy are requirements, not shipped claims.

Repository evidence

No implementation is claimed.

Next fail-closed gate

Define TypeSpec and JSON Schema as independent peer authorities, normalize and cross-check them, then add ORM, audit, and authorization tests.

08planned

Enterprise SSO and identity brokering

SAML and enterprise OIDC connections, verified domains, JIT enrollment, metadata rotation, and test-IdP flows are not available yet.

Repository evidence

No implementation is claimed.

Next fail-closed gate

Land protocol, connection lifecycle, domain ownership, signing, encryption, rollback, and conformance contracts before exposing setup controls.

09blocked

SCIM and directory synchronization

Provisioning, deprovisioning, groups, role mapping, cursor state, retries, quarantine, and reconciliation UI remain disabled.

Repository evidence

No implementation is claimed.

Next fail-closed gate

Publish SCIM 2.0 and directory connector authorities with idempotency, tombstones, replay handling, audit, and dead-letter recovery.

10planned

Sessions, devices, trusted-device policy, and global logout

A complete session and device inventory with bounded search, revocation, compromise response, and cross-region propagation is not exposed.

Repository evidence

No implementation is claimed.

Next fail-closed gate

Define device identifiers, privacy retention, trust state, revocation fan-out, event ordering, and read-after-write verification.

11blocked

Conditional access, risk signals, and adaptive challenges

No deterministic, versioned policy decision and explanation contract is currently available to customer or admin interfaces.

Repository evidence

No implementation is claimed.

Next fail-closed gate

Specify policy inputs, outputs, exceptions, safe degradation, privacy constraints, simulation, and rollback before enforcement controls appear.

12partial

Lifecycle, audit log, webhooks, and compliance export

Idempotent admin-operation primitives exist, but immutable identity event search, webhook delivery, replay, retention, and signed export views do not.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-admin-api-server.rs
  • shared-auth-admin-web-server.rs

Next fail-closed gate

Add retention-aware projections, delivery state, signed exports, privacy filters, redaction tests, and bounded replay authorization.

13in review

Isolated IAM administration

The private MASH, Leptos, and Dioxus console exposes an evidence ledger behind Shared Auth, product grants, and trusted-network admission.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-admin-web-server.rs#6

Next fail-closed gate

Pass repository-native gates and certify separate admin identities, secrets, database roles, origins, ingress, and audit in both runtimes.

14partial

SDKs, machine identities, webhooks, and test environments

Typed clients span several languages, while service-account lifecycle, API credential rotation, webhook tooling, and test-tenant UX remain incomplete.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-clients
  • shared-auth-interfaces

Next fail-closed gate

Version machine-principal contracts, credential rotation, webhook signatures, test clocks, fixtures, and generated client parity.

15partial

Hosted and headless UI, branding, localization, and accessibility

HTML-first SSR shells exist, but theme tokens, localization catalogs, accessibility conformance, and embeddable headless component contracts are incomplete.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-web-server.rs
  • shared-auth-admin-web-server.rs

Next fail-closed gate

Add WCAG gates, keyboard and focus suites, localization contracts, CSP-safe theming, and versioned component APIs.

16in review

Cloudflare, Cloud Run, and Kubernetes resilience

Exact-host routing and four-service desired state are in review; the production DNS, revisions, workloads, failover, and rollback are not control-plane certified.

Repository evidence

  • shared-auth-infra#26
  • shared-auth-infra#41
  • oresoftware/k8s-cluster#1452
  • shared-auth-e2e#34

Next fail-closed gate

Promote immutable digests only after exact-head tests, then prove DNS, TLS, private origin admission, readiness, failover, non-replayed writes, and rollback read-after-write.

Multi-cloud runtime

Cloudflare exact-host router. Four isolated services.

Google Cloud Run is the intended primary runtime andORESoftware/k8s-cluster is the intended fallback. Customer and administrator identities, service accounts, secrets, database roles, and origins stay separate. Safe reads may fail over; writes are never replayed after an origin may have received them.

PUBLIC EDGECloudflare exact-host routerDNS · TLS · request policy · bounded health-aware origin selection
PRIMARYGoogle Cloud Runfour service identities · immutable digest promotion
FALLBACKORESoftware/k8s-clusterfour direct Argo CD applications · namespace isolation
customer webcustomer APIadmin webadmin API

Static marketing origin

shared-auth.github.io remains the credential-free GitHub Pages origin and review URL. Cloudflare owns the canonical apex and mobile public hosts and may proxy only safe static methods to that artifact.

Exact authority contract

Twelve hosts. No wildcard fallback.

Unknown authorities fail before origin traffic. The apex and mobile host are static-only; only auth can inherit the legacy authentication pool. Both admin API spellings reach one authority directly so mutations are never redirected and replayed.

Canonical ores-shared-auth.com host contract
HostPurposeService / poolStaticState
ores-shared-auth.comCanonical public marketing sitemarketing / staticyesin review
auth.ores-shared-auth.comHosted authentication journeyauth / authnopartial
app.ores-shared-auth.comApplication selector and authenticated handoffapp / webnopartial
user.ores-shared-auth.comIndividual login, account, and security UIuser / webnoin review
org.ores-shared-auth.comOrganization login, membership, and tenant UIorg / webnoplanned
m.ores-shared-auth.comMobile-first user and organization entry selectormobile / staticyesin review
api.ores-shared-auth.comCustomer identity and account APIapi / apinopartial
admin.ores-shared-auth.comOperator IAM consoleadmin / admin-webnoin review
api-admin.ores-shared-auth.comCanonical operator IAM command APIadmin-api / admin-apinopartial
admin-api.ores-shared-auth.comDirect compatibility alias for the operator IAM command APIadmin-api / admin-apinopartial
quote.ores-shared-auth.comPublic quote intake handoffquote / webnopartial
pre-interest.ores-shared-auth.comPublic early-access interest handoffpre-interest / webnopartial

Production activation gate

DNS records, Worker Custom Domains, certificates, Cloud Run revisions, Kubernetes workloads, private-origin admission, health failover, and rollback become active only after read-after-write evidence from the actual Cloudflare, Google Cloud, and Kubernetes control planes. Repository code alone does not satisfy this gate.

Feature taxonomy inputs

Learn broadly. Copy nothing blindly.

These products inform feature discovery. Shared Auth keeps its own contracts, implementation, product language, security boundaries, and evidence thresholds; inclusion here is not a compatibility claim.